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1. Introduction 
 
Capital structure decisions are instrumental in everyday managerial finance 
(Stretcher and Johnson 2011).  The principal theoretical narratives on the capital 
structure choice have focused on the importance of the taxes that burden the supplier 
of capital on personal or a corporate level (Miller and Modigliani 1961; Modigliani 
and Miller 1963; Miller 1977).  However, the supplier of capital is not the only 
entity whose income is taxed. For every dollar of corporate sales, there may be a 
consumption tax on the consumer. Since this is not a tax on the investor, but a tax on 
the consumer, the consumption tax is considered to be an irrelevant topic in the 
capital structure debate, but only seemingly so: the consumption tax affects the 
quantity and the price of the goods that are sold and it thus affects corporate cash 
flows, capital budgeting and investment financing. This is the “tax incidence” effect. 
Unless supply is perfectly elastic or demand is perfectly inelastic, the consumption 
tax ends up burdening not only the consumer but also the producer. Having been 
through the literature, there has not been any previous theoretical or empirical 
research to explore the effect of tax incidence and the consumption tax on leverage, 
yield spreads and agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors. In this 
direction, the following analysis demonstrates the negative effect of the tax 
incidence (on the producer) and the consumption tax on the investment and default 
thresholds, delaying entry and precipitating default. The tax incidence effect and the 
consumption tax are also shown to have a negative effect on yield spreads, agency 
cost of debt and the optimal leverage ratio.  
The impact of consumption tax and tax incidence on investment timing and 
financing naturally affects corporate revenues and therefore government tax revenue 
from consumption and income taxes. In this model, government revenue is studied 
in a real options framework and optimal tax policies are estimated, calculating the 
level of the consumption tax that maximizes expected government revenue from 
taxation. The numerical results of this analysis provide us with a new approach to 
the “Ramsey rule” on consumption taxes, associating tax policies with optimal rules 
of irreversible investment under uncertainty.  
We proceed with a brief literature review on the association between 
corporate debt and taxes. Section 3 sets up a theoretical model for our capital 
budgeting problem of irreversible investment. Section 4 presents numerical results 
on the effects of the consumption tax on investment timing, agency costs of debt, 
yield spreads and optimal leverage. Section 5 calculates expected government 
revenues from taxes and suggests revenue maximizing tax policies, based on the 
effect of the consumption tax on investment timing and financing. The final section 
concludes the paper.  
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2.  An Outline of the Debt-and-Narrative 
 
Trading tax shields of corporate debt for bankruptcy costs: this is the main 
platform of the real options approach to the interaction between operating and 
financing decisions. Of course, this modeling idea is not fundamentally a real-
options one. Laying the foundations of modern microeconomic thought on corporate 
finance, Miller and Modigliani (1961) and Modigliani and Miller (1963) showed 
that a firm could actually increase its value without affecting its operating income, 
implementing an appropriate choice of the capital structure mix. The optimal 
magnitude of debt financing depends on the effects of the tax shields of corporate 
debt and the costs of financial distress. In this framework, it is the tax rate on 
corporate income that drives the capital structure choice. This theoretical result has 
generated significant implications for the theory and practice of corporate finance 
and there has been empirical evidence to show a positive effect of corporate income 
tax on the extent of debt financing (e.g. Graham 1999; Wu and Ye 2009). Much of 
the theoretical implications were structured on the suggestion that the original 
modeling assumptions of Modigliani and Miller were not realistic. One of the major 
streams of thought that aimed at refining the capital structure landscape and making 
it more realistic was the real options paradigm. Incorporating irreversibility and 
uncertainty in the capital budgeting problem, the real options models provided a new 
insight to the problem of capital structure and the conflicting incentives of creditors 
and shareholders. On the trade-off theory of capital structure, these real options 
models have produced theoretical results on the effect of corporate income tax on 
the capital structure choice. In the real options framework, the tax rate has been 
found to have an increasing effect on the optimal leverage ratio and respective yield 
spreads (Leland 1994; Childs et al. 2005; Mauer and Sarkar 2005) as well as on the 
agency costs of corporate debt (Childs et al. 2005; Mauer and Sarkar 2005). The 
standard trade-off setting of capital structure choice has been further refined to 
incorporate tax convexity (Sarkar 2008) and the effect of personal taxes (Gamba et 
al, 2008; Morellec and Schürhoff 2009).  
All these papers have focused on the dependence of the capital structure 
choice on corporate taxes and income taxes. Taxes, however, are not solely imposed 
on corporate profits and owners of corporate securities. They are also imposed on 
consumers; hence they affect corporate cash flows, capital budgeting and, thereof, 
the assessment of competing investment alternatives. This paper aims at covering 
this gap in the capital structure literature and also at discussing the optimal 
consumption tax as a function of corporate investment and financing decisions.  
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3.  Investment Timing, Capital Structure Choice and Government Tax 
Revenue 
 
Let’s consider a firm whose value consists of the right to invest in a project 
to manufacture and sell a single product. We assume that this investment right is 
exclusive and also perpetual. The operating and financing decisions are made by a 
manager who is assumed to be completely aligned with the interests of shareholders. 
Operating problems are associated with the decision to start and abandon the 
operations and financing problems amount to security design for investment 
financing. The project’s cost is I$  and it can be financed with a new equity issue. If 
the shareholders do not contribute all the needed capital to finance the investment, 
the firm can resort to a debt issue, equal to X$ , with coupon R$ . Should the firm 
default on its debt, the creditors take over the management and ownership. However, 
due to bankruptcy and reorganization costs as well as less efficient managerial skills, 
the project’s operating income will be reduced at a rate equal to b , 10  b . Upon 
project implementation, the firm produces and sells one product per unit of time, at a 
price  Y$  and an operating cost C$ . We assume that the market outcome on the 
product’s price follows a Geometric Brownian Motion: 
 
, 
 
where   is the risk-neutral drift rate,   the volatility of annual returns and dz  is 
the increment of a standard Wiener process. The government sets the tax rates 
before the initiation of the project: the firm’s income is taxed at a linear tax schedule 
  and there is also a consumption tax of T$  per unit of product bought. Legally, 
the consumption tax falls exclusively on the consumers, the firm just collecting the 
tax, on behalf of the government. Economically however, things can be different. A 
consumption tax tends to increase the market price and this means that demand 
decreases and the firm ends up earning (per unit of product) less than what it would 
earn in a framework without consumption taxes. In this setting, part of the burden of 
consumption tax may fall on the producer. This is a tax incidence effect and the 
magnitude of the tax incidence on the producers depends on the elasticities of 
demand and supply of the product. Let k  be a tax incidence coefficient: the firm 
therefore earns Y kT , 10  k . When demand is perfectly inelastic or supply is 
perfectly elastic, the (consumption) tax burden falls on the consumer and we 
have 0k . On the other hand, when demand is perfectly elastic or supply is 
perfectly inelastic, the tax burden falls on the producer and 1k 2. 
                                               
2 Assuming that we model a small firm in a large industry, the magnitude of tax incidence and the price 
process are exogenous to the firm (e.g. a small oil company does not affect oil prices). The extent of tax 
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3.1 Unlevered asset value 
We assume a frictionless, complete market for capital assets, with no 
information asymmetries and no opportunities for arbitrage. In such an investment 
setting, standard replication arguments can show that the value of the firm, after the 
project has been implemented, satisfies the following partial differential equation: 
 
      2 2 U UYY Y
1
Y V YV 0
2
UrV Y kT C
  (2.1), 
 
where r  is the risk free rate of return. 
The general solution of (2.1) is 
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and 1A  and 2A  are constants to be determined subject to the boundary conditions  
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 (3b) 
(3c). 
 
Applying (2.2) to (2.3a), (2.3b) and (2.3c) yields 
 
 
                                                                                                                         
incidence (k) is the outcome of (the elasticities of) supply and demand on an industry level. We adopt 
the industry-wide k for the small company, by assuming that the small firm is the "average" firm in the 
industry, a representative one. 
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and      
. 
 
3.2 Levered firm value 
In the case of the levered firm, the investment has been financed partly with 
debt: the shareholders’ financing and operating options include the option to default 
and the project’s cash flows now include an outflow equal to debt coupon . 
Applying the same valuation arguments as in the case of the unlevered firm, the 
value of equity  in the case of the levered firm is 
 
 
 
where  is the default trigger.  
The value of corporate debt , after the investment option has been 
exercised, satisfies the following partial differential equation 
 
 
 
The general solution to  is of the form 
 
 and  are calculated subject to boundary conditions  
 and 
. 
 
Boundary condition (2.6b) demonstrates our modeling assumption that the 
creditors receive the unlevered value of the firm, when default occurs. Substituting 
 and  in , we find the value of corporate debt 
 
. 
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Having calculated the value of debt, the value of the levered firm  can be 
estimated as the sum of the value of equity and the value of debt  
 
. 
 
The value of the levered firm equals the value of the unlevered firm minus 
the present value of expected bankruptcy costs plus the present value of expected tax 
shields of corporate debt. 
 
3.3. Pricing the option to invest 
The valuation of the option to invest can be structured on equity-value 
maximization or on firm-value maximization. We define the former case as “second-
best” whereas we define the latter as “first-best”. The value of the option to invest 
 satisfies the following partial differential equation 
  
 
 
The general solution to  is of the form 
  
,  
 
where  is the investment threshold that maximizes the value of equity, under the 
second-best scenario. ,  are constants to be determined subject to the boundary 
conditions  
 
 
 
 
 
We can find the second-best value of the option to invest by applying  and 
 to : 
. 
 
The second-best investment threshold satisfies the following implicit 
equation 
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. 
 
The value  of the debt that will be used to finance the investment can be 
derived from the second-best investment threshold: the lenders will grant credit 
knowing that the operating policy will be the second-best one and debt financing 
will therefore be . In this context, an optimal leverage ratio will be the ratio of 
debt to project value, for the coupon level  which maximizes the value of the real 
option to invest. Respectively, yield spreads are defined as the difference between 
the interest burden on corporate debt and the risk free rate of interest  . 
In a similar vein, applying value-matching and smooth-pasting conditions to 
the maximization of the firm value, we can obtain the value of the option to invest 
 under a first-best operating and investment policy: 
 
 , 
where  is the value maximizing (first-best) investment trigger and can be 
found through the smooth pasting condition and the respective implicit equation 
 
 
 
The fact that operating -and therefore financing- policies are different in 
equity maximization and value maximization yields agency costs of debt (e.g. 
Mauer and Triantis, 1994; Mauer and Ott, 2000). These costs, can be measured 
with the loss in firm value under second-best policies:  
 
. 
 
 
4. Effects of consumption taxation on operating and financing decisions  
 
To the extent that consumption taxes reduce corporate profitability through 
the effect of tax incidence on the producer, indirect taxation has an impact on 
investment timing and hence on aggregate output, the choice of leverage and the 
outcome of agency conflicts between shareholders and creditors. The main results of 
our analysis are: 
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Figure 1: Option Value vs Consumption Tax
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Result 1: The optimal investment and default thresholds are increasing in the 
consumption tax and the tax incidence on the producer. 
 
Result 2: The value of the option to invest, the optimal leverage ratio, the 
agency costs of debt and the yield spreads on corporate debt are decreasing in the 
consumption tax and the tax incidence on the producer. 
 
 For the deduction of these numerical results we employ the following base-
case parameters: 
Output  price:  
Coupon payment  
Operating cost  
Investment cost  
Risk free rate of interest  
Risk-neutral drift rate  
Bankruptcy costs  
Corporate tax rate  
Volatility of annual returns  
 
Figure 1. Sensitivity of option value to consumption tax, for varying tax incidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Output price  is $1, coupon payment  is $1, operating cost  is $0.25, 
investment cost (I) is $10, risk free rate of interest  is 0.04, drift rate  is 0.01, 
bankruptcy costs are 0.3, tax rate for corporate income is 0.4 and volatility of annual returns is 
0.3.   
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Figure 2a: Investment Trigger and Consumption Tax
FB
SB
0.25 0.3 0.35 0.4 0.45 0.5 0.55 0.6 0.65 0.7 0.75
1.4
1.6
1.8
2
2.2
2.4
2.6
2.8
3
3.2
Tax Incidence
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
tr
ig
ge
r
Figure 2b: Investment Trigger vs Tax Incidence
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Figure 2a. Sensitivity of first-best (FB) and second-best (SB) investment 
trigger to consumption tax 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Output price  is $1, coupon payment  is $1, operating cost  is $0.25, 
investment cost (I) is $10, risk free rate of interest  is 0.04, drift rate  is 0.01, bankruptcy 
costs are 0.3, tax rate for corporate income is 0.4, volatility of annual returns is 0.3 and the tax 
incidence coefficient  is 0.5. 
 
Figure 2b. Sensitivity of first-best (FB) and second-best (SB) investment 
trigger to tax incidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Output price  is $1, coupon payment  is $1, operating cost  is $0.25, 
investment cost (I) is $10, risk free rate of interest  is 0.04, drift rate  is 0.01, bankruptcy 
costs are 0.3, tax rate for corporate income is 0.4, the volatility of annual returns is 0.3 and the 
consumption tax  is $0.5. 
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Figure 3. Sensitivity of default trigger to consumption tax, for varying 
tax incidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Output price  is $1, coupon payment  is $1, operating cost  is 
$0.25, investment cost (I) is $10, risk free rate of interest  is 0.04, drift rate  is 
0.01, bankruptcy costs are 0.3, tax rate for corporate income is 0.4 and volatility of 
annual returns is 0.3.   
 
Result 1 comes from the negative effect of the consumption tax and the tax 
incidence effect on profitability. The profitability is affected not only per unit of 
product sold through tax incidence, but also through the fact that investment timing 
determines the quantity of units sold between entry and exit. The investment 
opportunity is less attractive for higher consumption tax rates when the tax incidence 
on the producer is positive ( ). Higher consumption tax rates, matched with 
higher levels of tax incidence reduce the part of cash inflows which actually 
constitutes revenue for the firm (the rest being a tax burden on the consumer). This 
means that the investment opportunity –in a second-best investment setting- 
decreases in value (Fig. 1) and therefore the project is delayed; we observe the 
higher investment threshold in Fig. 2a and Fig. 2b. Decreased profitability also leads 
to earlier exit from the project and default (Fig. 3). We see in Fig. 2a and 2b that, for 
all levels of consumption tax and tax incidence, the second-best policy induces 
overinvestment. 
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Figure 3: Default Trigger vs Consumption Tax
k=0.5
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Figure 4: Agency Costs of Debt vs Consumption Tax
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Figure 5: Yield spreads vs Consumption Tax
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Figure 4. Sensitivity of agency costs of debt to consumption tax, for varying 
tax incidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Output price  is $1, coupon payment  is $1, operating cost  is $0.25, 
investment cost (I) is $10, risk free rate of interest  is 0.04, drift rate  is 0.01, bankruptcy 
costs are 0.3, tax rate for corporate income is 0.4 and volatility of annual returns is 0.3.   
 
Figure 5. Sensitivity of yield spreads to consumption tax, for varying tax incidence   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Output price  is $1, coupon payment  is $1, operating cost  is $0.25, 
investment cost (I) is $10, risk free rate of interest  is 0.04, drift rate  is 0.01, bankruptcy 
costs are 0.3, tax rate for corporate income is 0.4 and volatility of annual returns is 0.3. 
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Figure 6: Deviation in Investment Trigger (%) vs Consumption Tax 
k=0.5
k=075
Figure 6. Sensitivity of deviations from first-best investment timing to 
consumption tax, for varying tax incidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Deviations are measured with the percentage difference between the first-best  and the 
second-best investment trigger , . Output price  is $1, coupon payment  is 
$1, operating cost  is $0.25, risk free rate of interest  is 0.04, investment cost (I) is $10, 
drift rate  is 0.01, bankruptcy costs are 0.3, tax rate for corporate income is 0.4 and the 
volatility of annual returns is 0.3.   
The overinvestment result accounts for the difference between the first-best 
and the second-best project value, the agency costs of debt. The fact that investment 
is, in part, financed with debt means that the shareholders have a strong inventive to 
speed up investment so as to realize the tax benefits of debt, thus increasing the risk 
that is associated with suboptimal investment and decreasing the welfare of the 
creditors. As the creditors are aware of these deviations from first-best investment 
strategies, they ask for higher yield spreads in order to extend credit to equity-
maximizing shareholders. The effect of consumption tax and the tax incidence effect 
on agency costs of debt and yield spreads depends on the effect of consumption tax 
on deviations from first-best operating policy. Fig. 4 shows that the agency costs of 
debt are decreasing in the consumption tax and the tax incidence on the firm. The 
decrease in the agency costs of debt -due to an increase in the consumption tax- and 
the respective decrease in the yield spreads (Fig. 5) can be explained with the effect 
that the consumption tax has on deviations from first-best investment. Fig. 6 shows 
that the percentage deviation from first-best investment timing is decreasing in the 
consumption tax and the tax incidence on the firm. It is because of these suboptimal 
investment effects, that agency costs of debt and yield spreads are decreasing in the 
consumption tax.  
 As we saw in Fig. 3, the effect of consumption tax and tax incidence on 
operating policy involves not only investment timing but also the decision to default. 
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Figure 8: Tax Shield - Bankruptcy Cost (%) vs Consumption Tax
Tax Shield
Bankruptcy Cost
The dependence of the default trigger on the consumption tax drives the effects of 
the consumption tax and tax incidence on optimal leverage.  
 
Figure 7. Sensitivity of second-best optimal leverage to consumption 
tax, for varying tax incidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Output price  is $1, coupon payment  is $1, operating cost  is $0.25, 
investment cost (I) is $10, risk free rate of interest  is 0.04, drift rate  is 0.01, bankruptcy 
costs are 0.3, tax rate for corporate income is 0.4 and volatility of annual returns is 0.3.   
 
Figure 8. Sensitivity of tax shields and bankruptcy costs to 
consumption tax, for varying tax incidence 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Tax shields and bankruptcy costs are measured as a percentage of firm value. Output price 
 is $1, coupon payment  is $1, operating cost  is $0.25, investment cost (I) is $10, 
risk free rate of interest  is 0.04, drift rate  is 0.01, bankruptcy costs are 0.3, tax rate for 
corporate income is 0.4 and volatility of annual returns is 0.3.   
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Figure 7: Optimal Leverage vs Consumption Tax
k=0.5
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 As default happens early due to the tax burden from the consumption tax 
and the tax incidence on the firm, the value of tax shields of corporate debt 
decreases and the optimal level of debt financing also decreases (Fig. 7). Actually, 
the leverage ratio depends on both the tax shields and the bankruptcy costs of debt, 
but it is the tax shields that significantly affect the capital structure choice: the tax 
shields account for a larger portion of project value, as can be seen in Fig. 8. 
 
 
5.  Taxing the Corporate Income: The Government’s Perspective 
 
While the real options approach has been applied to explore the effect of 
taxes on operating and financing decisions, there has been no attention -in this 
context- to a principal institutional motivation for taxes, which is the increase in 
government revenue. Since government revenue is contingent on the market price of 
project output and the firm’s investment decisions, our real option setting can show 
the dynamics of government revenue from taxes. Especially with respect to the 
consumption tax, its effect on government revenue has been a subject of major 
controversy (e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz 1976; Gordon et al. 2004); an increase in the 
tax rate may have the arithmetic effect of an increase in tax revenue but it may also 
have the economic effect of decreasing output and the tax base. The effect of 
consumption tax on investment -in our real option model- is based on the effect of 
the consumption tax on investment timing. 
 In the case of a project that has been financed with debt, the government’s 
revenue from taxes consists of the income tax on corporate earnings and the 
consumption tax. Hence, the government revenue per unit of time is 
 and the value of the government’s stake on the firm’s 
proceeds satisfies the following partial differential equation  
 
 
 
The general solution of  is  
. 
 and  are constants to be determined with the boundary conditions 
and 
. 
 
 is the value of the government’s stake on the firm’s proceeds in case of default. 
Then the creditors take over and the (unlevered) firm’s operating income falls by a 
fraction of . is therefore  
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. 
 
We can calculate  and with the boundary conditions 
 
 and 
. 
 
Using and  we find that 
 
 
Using , we can apply  and  to : the value of the 
government’s stake on the firm’s proceeds is 
 
. 
 
 Since government revenue starts flowing only after the project has started, 
we need to incorporate the effect of investment timing on government revenue. The 
present value of expected government revenue , conditional upon the project 
starting, satisfies the following partial differential equation 
 
. 
 
 is solved subject to boundary conditions, assuming a second-best operating 
setting: 
 
 
. 
 
The solution of  is of the form 
 
. 
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Figure 9: Government Revenue vs Consumption Tax
Substituting  and  to  we get the value of the government’s 
perspective revenues from taxation 
 
 . 
 
Figure 9. Sensitivity of expected government tax revenue to consumption tax  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Output price  is $1, coupon payment  is $1, operating cost  is $0.25, 
investment cost (I) is $10, risk free rate of interest  is 0.04, drift rate  is 0.01, bankruptcy 
costs are 0.3, tax rate for corporate income is 0.4, volatility of annual returns is 0.3 and the tax 
incidence coefficient  is 0.75.   
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Figure 10. Sensitivity of optimal consumption tax to the tax incidence coefficient 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note: Optimal consumption tax is defined as the level of consumption tax that maximizes the 
expected government tax revenue.  Output price  is $1, coupon payment  is $1, 
operating cost  is $0.25, investment cost (I) is $10, risk free rate of interest  is 0.04, drift 
rate  is 0.01, bankruptcy costs are 0.3, tax rate for corporate income is 0.4 and the volatility 
of annual returns is 0.3. 
 
In Fig. 9 we see the effect of an increase in the consumption tax on the 
expected government revenue. We see that an increase in the consumption tax can 
generate an increase in government revenue, but, beyond a certain level –  
in Fig. 9- the increased tax burdens discourage investment, reduce the tax base and 
decrease government revenue. Result 3 synopsizes the findings on the consumption 
tax and expected government revenue from taxation: 
 
Result 3: The expected tax revenue is initially increasing in the consumption 
tax, reaches a peak, and then is decreasing in the consumption tax, for higher levels 
of the consumption tax. 
 
 This effect of consumption taxation on expected government tax revenue 
and its optimal level depends on the level of tax incidence on the producer. Ramsey 
(1927) has shown that the level of optimal consumption taxation on a given product 
is inversely related to the product’s own-price elasticity of demand. The greater the 
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own-price elasticity of demand, the greater will be the tax incidence on the producer, 
ceteris paribus. Our model on capital structure provides a way to rediscover the 
Ramsey rule, in the framework of irreversible investment under uncertainty; 
numerically computing the level of the consumption tax that maximizes the 
expected government tax revenue, we find that it is decreasing in the degree of tax 
incidence on the producer and therefore inversely associated to the product’s own-
price elasticity of demand. Fig. 10 presents the numerical evidence that lead to our 
fourth result:    
 
Result 4: The level of consumption tax which maximizes the expected 
government tax revenue is decreasing in the tax incidence on the producer. 
 
 
6.  Final remarks 
 
Corporate finance has shown us that capital structure may depend on the 
taxes that are imposed on investors on a personal and a corporate level. Consumers 
are also taxed, however, and these taxes determine their willingness to purchase 
products and a shift in demand ends up altering the price of products in the market. 
This mechanism of tax incidence has an effect on corporate profits and thus on the 
structure of the capital budgeting problems. As the tax incidence on the producer can 
reduce corporate income, we have discovered that investment opportunities decrease 
in value and investment implementation is postponed. In a similar vein, 
consumption taxation can have a negative effect on the level of agency costs of debt, 
yield spreads and the optimal leverage ratio. The real option effects of consumption 
taxation and tax incidence also determine the magnitude of expected government tax 
revenue and thus are significant for the design of tax policies.   
Our findings can bear significant implications for future research: empirical 
work on the determinants of capital structure should include consumption tax and 
own-price elasticities of supply and demand, as these determine tax incidence. 
Furthermore, the model that is presented in this paper can be extended to incomplete 
markets, where information asymmetries and transaction costs intensify the 
emphasis on agency conflicts and the pecking order theory of capital structure could 
be more efficient in explaining corporate financial decision making. The extension 
to incomplete markets is also necessary for exploring interpersonal comparisons and 
aggregations of utilities, which are indispensible when alternative tax systems are 
evaluated on their effects on equality, redistribution of wealth, social rationality and 
welfare.  
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